Economic theory suggests some ambiguity concerning the effects of strengthening intellectual property rights (IPRs) on international trade. Here we extend the empirical literature that attempts to resolve this ambiguity. We use panel data to estimate a gravity equation for manufacturing exports, in aggregate and by industry, from five advanced countries to 69 developed and developing countries over the period 1970-99. In particular, we use threshold regression techniques to determine whether the impact of IPR protection on trade depends upon the level of development, imitative ability and market size of the importing country. We confirm the importance of the importers' imitative ability, and also find some evidence of a role for market size in this relationship. The individual industries present different patterns of thresholds and coefficients, with total manufacturing closely reflecting that of fabricated metal products.
Non-Technical Summary
There is considerable empirical support for the role of trade in international technology diffusion. Since innovations are intellectual property, the strength of an importer's Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) can be expected to affect its trade in goods embodying innovations. Two opposing effects of stronger IPRs on a country's imports have been identified in the literature. Imports may expand because stronger IPRs curtail domestic imitation. But they may contract if exporters choose to exercise their increased market power by reducing sales and raising prices. This theoretical ambiguity concerning the effects of strengthening IPRs on imports has led to several attempts at its empirical resolution. The evidence suggests that imitative ability and market size are important in this relationship, with market expansion effects in countries with high imitative ability and larger markets, and market power effects in countries with low imitative ability and small markets. But this evidence often relies on classifying countries into imitative ability or market size cohorts on a subjective basis, without being able to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes to the classification.
Here we examine manufacturing exports from the main innovating countries to a sample of 69 developed and developing countries. We estimate a gravity equation using panel data grouped into six five-year averages over the period 1970-99. Results are reported for both total manufacturing trade and nine twodigit ISIC industries. Our approach differs from most previous examinations in several respects. The use of: panel data; a wider range of advanced exporters; an alternative measure of imitative ability (schooling); explicit consideration of the interactions between imitative ability and market size; and, most significantly, the use of threshold regression techniques to split our observations into different regimes.
We begin with thresholds on the importer's level of development. This is of interest because of WTO membership typically involves significant strengthening of IPR regimes in developing countries. Our results indicate significant market expansion effects at relatively higher levels of development, but little effect either way for the least developed countries. Market power effects appear rare. We then estimate thresholds for imitative ability and market size separately. There is clear evidence of market expansion effects, but no evidence of market power effects related to imitative ability. The market size results indicate market power effects in only a single industry, and broad evidence of market expansion effects which tend to be stronger in larger markets.
Combined thresholds on imitative ability and market size yield widespread evidence of market expansion effects, increasing in market size, and no evidence of market power effects in countries with high imitative ability. Countries with limited imitative ability also show market expansion effects, largely unrelated to market size; and little evidence of market power effects. The influence of market size appears somewhat secondary to that of imitative ability.
The examination of combined thresholds on imitative ability and the level of IPRs brought the patterns previously identified in the literature into sharper focus. For countries with low imitative abilities, strengthening low IPRs led to a mixture of market expansion and market power effects. But there are industry-specific ceilings beyond which strengthening IPRs will have no significant effect on trade flows. For countries with high imitative abilities we found a clear separation of industries, into those with no significant effects and those with market expansion effects. These outcomes make clear that stronger IPRs will change not only the volume but also the composition of imports from these advanced countries.
Introduction
The TRIPS Agreement, a product of the Uruguay Round (1986-94) of trade negotiations, reflects a growing trend of linking trade policy and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regimes. The stated aims of TRIPS, which sets minimum standards of IPR protection to be provided by each World Trade Organisation (WTO) member, include encouraging both innovation and international technology diffusion. The argument relating IPR protection to innovation is clear. IPR protection provides innovators with the legally enforceable power to prevent others from using an intellectual creation or to set the terms on which it can be used. In the absence of such protection new technology or knowledge is likely to be copied or imitated, thus lowering the potential profits of the innovator and reducing the incentive for individuals to undertake innovative activities. To the extent that innovation encourages economic growth, as suggested by many endogenous growth models, we would also expect stronger IPR protection to impact positively upon economic growth. Empirical evidence supporting a relationship between IPRs and innovation has been found by Kanwar and Evenson (2004) ; other evidence supports the existence of a positive relationship between IPRs and economic growth (Gould and Gruben, 1996; Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 2006) .
The relationship between IPR protection and international technology diffusion on the other hand is less straightforward. Technology may be diffused across borders through a variety of formal and informal channels, including international patenting, trade in goods, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology licensing, the (temporary and permanent) migration of skilled workers and product imitation. In addition to stronger IPR protection possibly affecting these potential channels in opposing ways, often the relationship between IPR protection and a single channel is not unambiguous, depending upon the level of development of the receiving country and whether it is able to carry out significant technical innovation or imitate existing technology. Several empirical studies have considered the relationship between IPR protection and a particular channel of diffusion. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Smith (1999) for example consider the relationship between IPRs and trade, while Smarzynska (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (1996) consider the importance of IPR protection for FDI and patenting respectively. Others (for example, Maskus, 1998; Smith, 2001) consider the impact of IPR protection on multiple channels of diffusion simultaneously. The outcomes of these studies are mixed, though stronger evidence is found for the importance of IPR protection for trade and patenting than for FDI 1 .
A now large empirical literature supports the role of international trade in transferring technology both among developed countries (for example, Coe and Helpman, 1995) and from developed to developing countries (for example, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997) . While issues remain to be resolved (Keller, 2004 ) the evidence concerning trade as a channel of technology diffusion is perhaps the most consistent of all of the potential channels. In this paper we concentrate on the importance of IPR protection for international trade. Specifically, we examine the importance of IPR protection for manufacturing exports from the G5 countries, in which the bulk of world innovative activity (as measured by R&D expenditure) is conducted, to a sample of 69 developed and developing countries. To do this we estimate a gravity equation using panel data grouped into six five-year averages over the period 1970-99. Results are reported for both total manufacturing trade and nine two-digit ISIC industries. In addition to estimating a linear relationship between IPR protection and trade, we examine whether this relationship depends upon the level of development, imitative ability and market size of the importing country using threshold regression techniques which allow us to estimate both the number of regimes and their position.
Two opposing effects of stronger IPRs on a country's imports have been identified in the literature. Imports may expand with the curtailment of domestic imitation, but may contract if exporters choose to exercise their increased market power. The empirical literature to date has found evidence of both effects, depending on the imitative ability of the importing country. Our results confirm the prevalence of market expansion effects. We also find some evidence of market power effects, but these are scattered and much less prevalent than previously thought. Our investigation also highlights the importance of one industry (Fabricated Metal Products) in determining the link between strengthened IPRs and aggregate imports from these countries. The other industries behave in different ways, implying that stronger IPRs will affect both the volume and composition of these imports, although no clear link with industry R&D intensity is evident.
1 Even where the evidence indicates a relationship between IPR protection and a specific channel of diffusion, it is often the case that there is little evidence of effective technology transfer. This is particularly the case for FDI. See Falvey, Foster and Memedovic (2006) for a review of the impact of IPRs on the channels of diffusion.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarises the theory and evidence linking IPR protection to international trade. Section 3 describes our empirical approach, while Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 describes the results and Section 6 summarises our results and offers some conclusions.
Background
Increased IPR protection in a country can directly impact on its imports in two alternative ways. On the one hand, firms should be encouraged to export their goods into foreign markets with strong IPR protection, since such protection reduces the risk of piracy that can diminish the profitability of the firm's activity in that country. In this respect, stronger IPR protection would be expected to raise imports. On the other hand, because stronger IPR protection reduces the ability of domestic firms to imitate, it increases the market power of the exporter, which may encourage the latter to act in a monopolistic manner by reducing sales. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) thus argue that there is a "trade-off between the enhanced market power for the firm created by stronger patents and the larger effective market size generated by reduced abilities of local firms to imitate the product." (p. 229).
The 'market power' effect would induce the foreign firm to export less to the domestic market, while the 'market expansion' effect would shift the demand curve facing the firm and encourage larger sales. Taylor (1993) also suggests that a third factor may be important for larger markets with significant imitative abilities, with stronger IPR protection encouraging imports by reducing the need for firms to modify their products to try to deter local imitation, thus reducing costs for exporting firms.
Maskus and Penubarti argue that the 'market expansion' effect is likely to dominate in larger countries with strong imitative abilities, while the 'market power' effect would dominate in smaller countries with weak imitative abilities. Naturally the relative importance of these effects is also likely to depend on product and market characteristics.
Some products are easier to imitate than others, and some products have closer substitutes than others. An insignificant effect of stronger IPR protection on aggregated trade volumes could mask significant effects for some individual industries. Hence our interest in also considering disaggregated trade flows below. The impact of IPR protection on trade will also depend on the exporter. If the latter is not an innovator, then imports from this country are less likely to embody new technology and IPR protection should be relatively unimportant for trade, hence our decision to concentrate on exports from those countries that are important producers of new knowledge.
A further complication concerns a firm's decision on its mode of serving a foreign market.
In general it faces three possibilities: it may export the good, undertake FDI or license its intellectual asset to a foreign firm. The level of IPR protection may affect the firm's choice, and thus strong IPR protection might diminish trade if it induces firms to choose to serve a foreign market by FDI or licensing rather than exporting (Ferrantino, 1993 High-tech trade is isolated in the expectation that the effects of IPR protection should be stronger for knowledge-intensive trade. The explanatory variables include standard gravity factors (the GDP and populations of both trade partners, distance between trade partners and dummies for common border, common language and membership of preferential trading arrangements) plus a measure of IPR protection for the destination country developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) . They deal with the problem of zero trade flows by estimating two equations, one for the probability of zero observations and the other for the magnitude of positive trade flows. They find that stronger IPR protection has a small but significantly positive impact on the probability that countries trade with each other and a significantly positive impact on bilateral trade flows for both total non-fuel imports and exports. But, contrary to expectations, stronger IPR protection is found to have a significantly negative impact on the probability that two countries trade in high-tech goods and no significant impact on bilateral high-tech trade flows. This suggests the presence of a combination of strong market power effects and a tendency for stronger IPR protection to induce producers of high-tech goods to serve foreign markets by licensing or FDI rather than exports.
Considering exports from a large sample of innovating countries has the advantage of allowing for the inclusion of exporter fixed effects. Concentrating on exports from a single country, however, means that we need not be concerned that the distribution of exports will also depend upon the trade stance of the exporting country (Maskus, 2000) . Smith (1999) The importing countries are then divided into four groups depending on the threat of imitation (defined according to the level of patent rights and R&D spending as a percentage of GNP). Dummies for these four groups were then interacted with the IPR variable. Smith finds a negative relationship between IPR protection and imports from the US for those countries with the weakest threat of imitation, and a positive relationship for those with the strongest threat of imitation. Overall, she concludes that US exports depend upon IPR protection in importing countries, but that the direction of the relationship depends on the threat of imitation. Weak IPRs are a barrier to US exports, but only for countries that pose a strong threat of imitation. Rafiquzzaman (2002) carries out a similar analysis on Canadian manufactured exports.
Market expansion effects are found for countries with the strongest threat of imitation, and some evidence of market power effects is found where the threat of imitation is weakest.
While the outcomes are broadly similar to those that Smith found for the US, the indications of market power effects are generally weaker for Canadian exports.
Recently Co (2004) has extended this approach to a panel framework for a sample of 71 countries over the period 1970-92. Panel data allows one to take account of changes in patent regimes and imitative ability over time, and better controls for unmeasured heterogeneity. Once again the ratio of R&D to GNP is used as a measure of imitative ability, here being interacted with the Ginarte and Park IPR variable. She finds that IPR protection has a negative and significant impact on US exports of non-R&D intensive goods, suggesting that market power effects dominate for this trade, but no significant impact on R&D intensive goods, an outcome similar to that found by Fink and PrimoBraga (2005) for high-tech trade. The coefficients on the interaction between IPR protection and imitative ability are found to be positive and significant for both types of goods, suggesting that the impact of IPR protection depends upon the level of imitative ability, with increased IPR protection having a positive impact on trade in all goods above a certain level of imitative ability 2 .
In summary, the evidence from this small empirical literature supports the following hypotheses (see also Fink and Maskus, 2005) . First, the level of IPR protection does matter for at least some trade flows in manufactured goods. Second, strengthening IPRS can lead to market power effects for some trade flows, particularly for importing markets where the threat of imitation is small (due to a small market, limited capacity for imitation or an existing high level of IPRs). Third, strengthening IPRs can lead to market expansion effects for other trade flows, particularly in importing markets with a significant threat of imitation. Finally, the responsiveness of trade in R&D intensive products to increased IPR protection may be difficult to predict, given that these products may be particularly hard to imitate anyway, and that their producers can choose to serve foreign markets through FDI and licensing. These hypotheses are among those explored further below. Our particular point of departure is the observation that to date the tests of hypotheses concerning the levels of IPR protection, market size and imitative ability have relied on the division of the sample into groups based on exogenous criteria with respect to both the number of groups and the location of the thresholds that divide them. Recently developed threshold regression techniques allow both the number and location of these thresholds to be determined from the data rather than imposed. They also allow the number and location of the thresholds to differ across industries.
Empirical Analysis
We follow the literature in estimating a gravity equation to determine the impact of IPR protection on the manufacturing imports of our sample of countries. While the exact specification of the gravity equation can vary, our equation includes the GDPs and populations of the importer and exporter, the distance between them and other variables that may enhance or restrict trade. The starting point for our analysis is the following equation; where i and j denote the importing and exporting country respectively, and t denotes the time period, TRADE is exports from j to i in a particular category; DIST is the great circle distance between the capitals; GDPM and POPM are the GDP and population of the importing country; GDPX and POPX are the GDP and population of the exporting country; COMLAN takes the value one if trading partners share a common language; COMBOR takes the value one if the trading partners share a common border; LOCK takes the value one if the importing country is landlocked; IPR is our index of IPR protection in the importing country; i , j and t are importer, exporter and time fixed effects; and ijt is a normally distributed error term.
We expect that, in line with existing literature, distance will have a negative impact on trade flows by increasing transport costs. The GDP's of the importing and exporting country are expected to have a positive impact on trade flows. In the former this is due to a higher GDP indicating a larger market size, which should increase imports, while in the latter higher levels of GDP represent higher productive capacity. There is some ambiguity over the expected sign of the coefficients on population. In general, a larger population is usually associated with a larger country size, which is likely to lead to more diversified production and higher levels of self-sufficiency, and should lower trade flows and imports in particular. A larger population also allows a country to take fuller advantage of economies of scale leading to increased intra-industry trade (Prewo, 1978) . For an exporting country therefore, a larger population by encouraging economies of scale would seem to imply larger manufacturing exports. A common language should facilitate communication between trade partners and reduce the search costs of international trade. A common language may reflect former colonial ties, which for historical reasons may also lead to greater trade flows. A common border facilitates trade, but being landlocked is generally considered to reduce international trade due to the relatively high cost of overland transportation. Finally, while these are the expected coefficients for data on total trade we may expect deviations from this when we consider industry data.
While the majority of studies using the gravity equation to predict trade flows employ cross-section data, the use of panel data allows us to capture the relationship between IPRs and trade over a longer period of time; to account for changing IPR regimes and imitative ability; to control for the overall business cycle and to disentangle the time invariant country-specific effects (Egger, 2000) ; and to control for unmeasured country and timespecific heterogeneity (Co, 2004) . When using panel data we need to make a choice between the fixed and the random effects estimator. Co (2004) largely relies on a random effects model since with only one exporter a fixed effects model would preclude the inclusion of time-invariant variables such as distance and the common border dummy. Mátyás (1997) and Egger (2000) argue that where possible a three way fixed effects model (including importer, exporter and time specific fixed effects) should be estimated. Egger for example argues that since the effects we seek to capture are trade policy and other export driving and impeding 'environmental' factors, including historical and geographical determinants which tend not to be random, a fixed effects estimator is more appropriate.
These fixed effects are represented by i , j and t in the above equation 3 .
The estimate of coefficient in [1] gives us a simple linear estimate of the impact that IPR protection has on a country's imports from our five developed countries. But, as discussed above, there are reasons to believe that the relationship between IPR protection and trade is non-linear, and in particular that it may depend upon the level of development, imitative ability and the market size of the importing country. To test these hypotheses we employ the threshold techniques of Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 1999 Hansen ( and 2000 4 , which allow us to estimate rather than impose both the number of regimes and the positioning of the splits. The method is based on a threshold regression where observations fall into regimes that depend on an estimated value of an observed variable (e.g. a measure of imitative ability). In the two-regime model, for example, we have
where is the estimated breakpoint or threshold. Here the observations are separated into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable, TH it , is smaller or larger than the value . The impact of IPR protection on trade will be given by 1 for countries in the low-regime (i.e. 
TH
) and by 2 for countries in the high-regime (i.e.
λ > it TH
). We estimate the threshold (   as the value that minimises the concentrated sum of squared errors from the least squares regression. In practice this involves searching over distinct values of the threshold variable (TH it ) for the value of that minimises the sum of squared errors.
After obtaining a value of , we can estimate the parameters of our gravity equation.
Having found the threshold we identify whether it is statistically significant by testing the null hypothesis that 2 1 δ δ = . Rejecting the null hypothesis allows us to conclude that a threshold exists in the IPR-Trade relationship. One complication is that the threshold is not identified under the null hypothesis, implying that classical tests do not have standard distributions and critical values cannot be read off standard distribution tables. We follow Hansen (1996) and bootstrap to obtain the p-value for the test of a significant threshold 5 .
This technique can be extended to consider the possibility of more than one threshold (i.e. more than two regimes). We decide upon the optimal number of thresholds by first estimating a single threshold. If this is found to be significant, we search for a second threshold using sequential estimation 6 . If this second estimated threshold is significant we search for a third threshold and so on. As is common in the literature, we impose the restriction that at least 20 percent of observations must lie in each regime to maintain a reasonable sample size in each. This implies that the maximum number of regimes we can consider is five.
The data that we use and its sources are described in the Appendix. We examine manufacturing exports from the five largest developed countries to a sample of 69 other developed and developing countries 7 . World R&D is concentrated in the OECD countries 8 , and within the OECD heavily concentrated in these five countries 9 . Table 1 ( Column 2) shows that in all industries the leading five countries make up over 80% of total R&D spending by the 15 OECD countries for which we have data. Also reported in Table 1 are the average industry shares in total manufacturing R&D for the G5 countries over the period 1973-1998. It is clear from these figures that R&D is heavily concentrated in two of the two-digit industries, Chemicals and, particularly, Fabricated Metal. The third column of Table 1 reports the ratio of industry R&D to industry production in our five exporting countries, with data averaged over the period 1978-1996, to give an indication of their relative R&D intensities. Once again Chemicals and Fabricated Metal tend to be the most R&D intensive, with much smaller intensities found in the other industries. The final column gives the share of each industry's exports in total manufacturing exports. Not 6 While it is straightforward to search for more than one threshold simultaneously, this can be expensive in terms of computation time. Fortunately Chong (1994), Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998) have shown that sequential estimation is consistent, thus avoiding this computation problem. In the two threshold case, the method involves fixing the first threshold at its estimated value and searching for a second threshold assuming that the first threshold is fixed. This method can then be extended to any number of thresholds. To test for the significance of the second threshold the bootstrap procedure is once again followed, with the test discriminating between one and two thresholds. 7 The five exporting countries are France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA. The importing countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxemburg, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea (Republic of), Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 8 UNIDO (2002) notes that the share of R&D financed by enterprises in advanced countries was 98% in the 1980s and 94% in the 1990s. 9 The ANBERD database reports total manufacturing R&D expenditure for 15 OECD countries for , and the average share of R&D expenditure by these five economies over that period was 91.4%. There has been a slight decline in this share over the sample period from 92.8% in 1973 to 89.4% in 1998.
unexpectedly given the figures in the previous columns, exports from the G5 to our sample of importing countries are concentrated in Fabricated Metals and, to a lesser extent, Chemicals. The predominance of the former is reflected in the results that follow.
Finally, we explain our choices for threshold variables. As discussed above, the literature points to the relationship between IPR protection and trade depending upon an importer's level of development, imitative ability and market size. We measure an importer's level of 1973-1998. 3 This column reports the ratio of industry R&D expenditure to industry production. The figures are averages over the period 1978-1996 for the G5 countries. R&D data are expressed in current PPP US dollars.
Production data is expressed in current prices and in national currency. The production data was converted to US dollars, using the PPP exchange rates provided in the STAN database.
These PPP's are based on a comparison of consumer goods prices, and are neither industryspecific nor do they reflect relative producer prices. The conversion of these industry-level production data to a common currency should be interpreted with caution therefore. 4 The figures in this column refer to the average shares of exports from the G5 in each industry out of total exports to our sample of importing countries over the period 1970-1999. development by its GDP per capita. Imitative ability refers to a country's capacity to copy and produce technology and goods produced elsewhere, and is likely to depend upon a range of factors. Smith (1999) employs data on R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP and the level of IPR protection to split her sample into four groups. But the unavailability of R&D data is limiting in a panel context, and the reliability of the data that is available for developing countries has been questioned 10 . Therefore we measure imitative ability using the average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 (SYR) 11 . Using 10 Maskus (2000) observes that "in the developing economies R&D data are highly suspect and not comparable to those in developed countries" (p. 118). He also notes that Smith's designations of countries into the four groups based on R&D data led to a number of anomalies. 11 We also considered the average years of higher education in the population over 15, but given the similarity of these results with those for secondary schooling we choose to omit them from the paper. They are available upon request, however.
education data, which was also suggested by Smith, gives us another check on the robustness of her results. The final threshold variable that we consider is the level of GDP, as a measure of market size. We expect that the incentive to imitate will be greater in larger markets, other things equal, but that firms in advanced countries may take advantage of market power in smaller markets.
Results

A Linear Relationship
The results of estimating each regression separately using OLS with the IPR variable included linearly are reported in Table 2 12 . All variables are expressed in natural logarithms (except for the dummies and the IPR variable). To ease interpretation we report the results for the two-digit industries listed in descending order of their R&D intensity. The results for the "core" gravity variables are broadly as anticipated, taking into account our small number of exporters and that trade flows are more heavily influenced by the comparative advantage factors picked up by the (unreported) country dummies as we consider narrower industry definitions. We find a negative and significant coefficient on distance. The coefficient on importer GDP is consistently positive and significant, while the coefficient on the population of the importer is negative and significant. Rather unexpectedly the exporter's GDP often has a negative coefficient when it is significant, but this seems to be largely a consequence of the inclusion of fixed effects 13 . The exporter's population usually has a positive coefficient when it is significant. While a common language appears to consistently raise the level of imports across industries, the coefficient on the common border dummy is found to vary in both sign and significance. Again this seems to be a consequence of the inclusion of fixed effects 14 . The coefficient on landlocked sometimes shows "perverse" signs for the same reason.
Turning to the IPR variable, we have significant positive coefficients for all industries, with the exception of Textiles for which an insignificant positive coefficient is found. While we do not wish to make too much of these results, since this is not our preferred specification, we note that there is no obvious relationship between the size of the coefficient on IPRs and R&D intensity at the industry level, with the largest coefficient on IPRs being found in
Food. This illustrates an important point. Our IPR index is that constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and is specifically based on the strength of patent protection in the country concerned (see the Appendix for details). While patent protection is particularly significant for R&D intensive industries, a country with a strong patent regime is very likely to provide strong protection for all forms of intellectual property. Certainly TRIPs defines rights across a wide spectrum 15 . As a result we interpret the Ginarte and Park index as a general IPR index, and expect that it may prove significant in industries where IPRs other than patents are important.
Were our investigations to cease at this point, we would conclude that strengthening IPRs would raise exports to all countries, for all manufacturing industries (except one) and would reduce exports in none. But our discussion of the relevant theory and empirical literature indicated that the relationship between IPRs and trade was very likely non-linear in form, with the impact of strengthening IPRs likely to depend on product and importing country characteristics. The coefficients estimated in the linear equation would then represent an "average" effect, whose literal interpretation could be quite misleading. Our threshold regression analysis will demonstrate this.
Single Variable Thresholds
Our initial approach to examining the importance of third variables in the relationship between IPR protection and trade is to estimate the optimal number of thresholds for each of our three threshold variables in turn. For each threshold variable we report the location of the significant thresholds (both the value and its percentile location) and the coefficient and t-value on IPR protection for each of the corresponding regimes, for each industry 16 .
Thresholds on the Level of Development
15 TRIPs includes agreements on the following forms of intellectual property; copyrights and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed secrets. 16 For brevity and ease of presentation we choose not to report the coefficients on the other gravity variables. These results are available upon request and are broadly in line with those reported in Table 3 .
The results reported in Table 3 use the level of development of the importer (specifically the natural log of GDP per capita) as the threshold variable 17 . Our major interest in these results lies in their implications for the impact of strengthened IPR protection on the imports of developing countries. In recent years the latter have shown increased interest in WTO membership as a means of gaining improved access to export markets. At the same time they have expressed concern over the power to advanced country exporters they may concede in their own markets through the accompanying TRIPs obligations. The estimation of thresholds on GDP per capita should indicate the degree to which the existence and strength of market power and market expansion effects are related to importers' levels of development.
The first row in Table 3 shows that there are three significant thresholds for Manufacturing, Recall that this industry was the only industry for which the coefficient on IPRs was not 17 Note that in this Table there are occasions in which the last estimated threshold was significant. In these cases it was not possible to search for a further threshold whilst maintaining the restriction that 20% of observations must lie in each regime. In these cases we report the results in Table 4 based on the last significant estimated threshold. 18 The thresholds are marked in italics and are located horizontally in this and the following two tables so as to give a rough indication of their relative location across industries.
significant in the linear regression. Here this is explained as the average of significant market power effects in countries with the lowest levels of development and significant market expansion effects in countries with the highest levels of development. Smith (1999) and Rafiquzzaman (2002) Total Manufacturing imports from our five advanced exporters. Table 3 shows that similar thresholds exist for the two-digit manufacturing industries. For these countries there is the prospect of increased technology diffusion through commodity trade. But for the least developed countries, specifically those below the 26 th percentile, strengthening their intellectual property regimes will not increase imports from advanced countries, and indeed will likely reduce them in Textiles. For these countries the prospect of assuming the full TRIPs obligations would appear unattractive. Fortunately many of them can obtain access for their exports under alternative schemes (e.g. through the GSP). Table 4 performs the same analysis using our measure of imitative ability (SYR) as the threshold variable. In this case we expect to observe market expansion effects for countries with high levels of imitative ability, with the possibility of market power effects for those countries with little ability to imitate advanced technology. Manufacturing has one significant threshold and IPRs have a significant positive coefficient in each regime, but larger in the higher regime. This outcome matches that for Fabricated and Chemicals, though the latter's threshold is at a higher level. The other industries show a variety of outcomes, with one to three thresholds. There is only one negative coefficient, and that is insignificant, so there is no evidence of market power effects associated with imitative ability. With one exception (Basic) all coefficients are increasing, positive if significant and either always significant or significant in the higher regimes. There is thus clear evidence that strengthening IPRs increases trade, at least above some level of imitative ability, and that this effect is stronger at higher levels of imitative ability. In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 confirm that the strength of importer's IPRs is a significant determinant of its manufacturing imports from our five advanced countries. This is evident in Manufacturing exports, and to a greater or lesser degree in the exports of individual manufacturing industries, though it seems that Fabricated most closely matches the aggregate behavior. We find no significant market power effects associated with imitative ability, and those associated with a small market size at the aggregate level reflect those in Fabricated only. Market expansion effects are pervasive at higher levels of imitative ability, and are also evident when we consider market sizes, tending to be stronger in larger markets in most industries.
Thresholds on Imitative Ability
Thresholds on Market Size
Dual Variable Thresholds
In this section we explore the possibility of interactions between different threshold variables. Specifically we examine whether the relationship between strengthening IPRs and trade depends upon the interaction between imitative ability and both the level of IPR protection and market size. The approach we adopt involves three steps. First we take the highest significant threshold on secondary schooling from where Z it is either the level of IPR protection or the natural log of the level of GDP.
Thresholds on Imitative Ability and Market Size
The first cases we consider are interactions between secondary schooling and the level of GDP. IPRs are likely to matter more in countries where imitation is more likely, and both high imitative ability (as measured by an educated workforce) and a large market size (as measured by the level of GDP) make imitation more likely, in the latter case due to a large market making successful imitation more profitable. Is it the case, as Maskus and Penurbati suggest, that market expansion effects dominate in larger countries with stronger imitative abilities, while market power effects dominate in smaller countries with weaker imitative abilities? Table 6 reports our results. In the high imitative ability regime the coefficients are positive and significant for all market sizes (except the small market size for Wood). The coefficients are increasing in market size for Manufacturing exports and for six of the industries, and the coefficients are independent of market size for the other three. There is thus clear evidence of market expansion effects, increasing in market size, in countries with high imitative ability. In contrast, the results in the low imitative ability regime are less clear cut. There are no significant effects for Manufacturing exports. The only evidence of market power effects is in Other in small markets. Elsewhere there is evidence of market expansion effects for both small and large market sizes for one industry (Food), for small markets only for three (Chemicals, Paper and Textiles) and for large markets only for another three (Fabricated, Basic and Wood). The coefficients are greater in larger markets in five industries, and lower in four. Clearly there is little evidence of market power effects, and while market expansion effects are common, they are almost equally split between large and small markets. In general, it seems that market size has an ambiguous impact on the IPR-Trade relationship for countries with low imitative ability, but that for countries with high levels of imitative ability market expansion effects tend to be larger in countries with large markets.
Thresholds on Imitative Ability and IPR Protection.
Here we follow the standard approach in the literature, originating with Smith (1999) , of splitting the sample into four groups based on both the level of IPR protection and imitative ability. This reflects the view that, although high imitative ability will make imitation more likely, this can be countered by high levels of IPR protection that reduces the threat of imitation. We re-examine this hypothesis using an alternative measure of imitative ability (schooling rather than R&D spending) and a broader sample of exporting countries, as well as allowing the thresholds on both variables to be determined endogenously and to vary across industries.
We have evidence that stronger IPRs are more important when imitative ability is high from section 4.2.2. We now consider discontinuities in this relationship. Our results are presented in Table 7 . Consider first the regimes where imitative ability is low. Here there is clear evidence that strengthening IPRs beyond a threshold (which is industry specific) will not affect imports from these advanced countries. For all industries (except Food) the coefficient on IPRs is not statistically significant in the higher IPR range. This is largely as expected; countries in the high IPR regime have a lower threat of imitation, suggesting that market expansion effects may be limited. Unlike Smith (1999) however, we find little evidence of market power effects for this regime. In the low IPR regime we find the coefficient on IPRs to be significant in all industries (except Other and Basic). For Manufacturing and five industries there is evidence of market expansion effects in this regime. For two industries there is evidence of significant market power effects. We conclude that countries with limited imitative ability will find that strengthening their IPR regimes will initially increase manufacturing imports from these five countries, but that this will be accompanied by a shift in the composition of these imports, away from those industries with significant market power effects towards those with significant market expansion effects. Once the IPR regime becomes sufficiently strong, however, further strengthening will leave imports unaffected (except for Food).
A clear pattern also emerges for countries with high imitative abilities. For those industries exhibiting market power effects when imitative ability is low, strengthening IPRs generally has no significant effect when imitative ability is high. For those industries exhibiting market expansion effects when imitative ability is low, strengthening IPRs also has market expansion effects when imitative ability is high, though this effect is invariably weaker in the higher IPR regime (except for Paper where the effects are the same), reflecting the smaller threat of imitation. In general, countries with high imitative ability will find that strengthening their IPR regime leads to increased Manufacturing imports, with similar shifts in the broad composition of these imports occurring as for countries with low imitative ability, since the same industries expand for both low and high imitative ability.
These outcomes broadly support previous results, except that there is far less evidence of market power effects. There are two other noteworthy aspects of these outcomes. The first is the separation of the two-digit industries into two groups -those exhibiting market power effects and those exhibiting market expansion effects. The second is that this separation bears no obvious relationship to an industry's R&D intensity.
Finally, are these results consistent with the argument that the coefficients on IPRs should decline as we move away from regimes with the greatest threat of imitation? Intuitively, countries with high imitative ability and low IPR protection provide the greatest threat of imitation, and those with low imitative ability and high IPR protection offer the least.
Countries with high imitative ability and high IPR protection and countries with low imitative ability and low IPR protection are somewhere in between. Do our estimated IPR coefficients decline in this way? The answer is yes for those industries that exhibit market expansion effects, but there is no consistent pattern for those that exhibit market power effects.
Summary and Conclusions
The theoretical ambiguity concerning the effects of strengthening IPRs on imports has been much emphasised in the literature and has led to several attempts at its empirical resolution.
The general conclusions that have emerged are that imitative ability and, to a lesser extent, market size are important in this relationship, with strong evidence of market expansion effects in countries with high imitative ability and larger markets, and rather weaker evidence of market power effects in countries with low imitative ability and small markets.
But establishing these outcomes has often relied on classifying countries into imitative ability or market size cohorts on a subjective basis, without being able to determine the sensitivity of the outcomes to the classification.
As has become standard, we use a variant of the gravity equation to examine the impact of IPR protection on trade, but otherwise our approach differs from most previous examinations in several respects. Firstly, we employ panel data rather than the more usual cross-section data, thus allowing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity both across countries and time. We also consider a wider range of advanced exporters than is usual in the literature. Secondly, we use an alternative measure of imitative ability (schooling) and explicitly consider the interactions between imitative ability and market size. Finally, and most significantly, rather than splitting our observations into different regimes in a subjective manner or making certain assumptions about the form of such interactions (i.e. a linear interaction term), we use threshold regression techniques to estimate both the number of regimes and their positioning.
While we are inclined to agree with previous authors that an importer's imitative ability and market size are likely to be the key characteristics in determining the impact of stronger IPRs on trade flows, the link with the importer's level of development is of some interest in its own right because of the debate over the potential benefits to developing countries from WTO membership. A major concern for these countries has been the implications of TRIPs standards of IPRs for competition in their domestic markets. Our results indicate the likelihood of significant market expansion effects for those countries at relatively higher levels of development, but (except for one industry) no significant effects either way for the least developed countries. While this does not preclude market power effects for individual products, it does suggest that they are not widespread.
We began our investigation of the links between imitative ability, market size and the strength of IPRs by estimating thresholds for imitative ability and market size separately.
This revealed clear evidence of market expansion effects, but no evidence of market power effects related to imitative ability. The market power effects observed for Total Manufacturing exports in small markets appear to reflect the outcome in a single industry (Fabricated Metal Products). Again there was broad evidence of market expansion effects which tended to be stronger in larger markets.
We then considered combined thresholds on imitative ability and market size. We found widespread evidence of market expansion effects, increasing in market size, and no evidence of market power effects in countries with high imitative ability. For countries with limited imitative ability, there is also evidence of market expansion effects in most industries, but no clear pattern with regard to market size; and evidence of market power effects in only one industry. We conclude that while market size is not irrelevant to the impact of strengthened IPRs, its influence is somewhat secondary to that of imitative ability.
The examination of combined thresholds on imitative ability and the level of IPRs was directly comparable to the results based on subjective thresholds in the literature. Allowing thresholds to vary across industries brought the patterns previously identified into sharper focus. For countries with low imitative abilities, strengthening low IPRs will lead to market expansion effects for most industries, but market power effects for some. But for each industry (except Food) there is a ceiling beyond which strengthening IPRs will have no significant effect on trade flows. For countries with high imitative abilities we found a clear separation of industries. Those which exhibit market power effects when imitative ability is low show no significant effects from strengthening IPRs when imitative ability is high.
Those which exhibit market expansion effects when imitative ability is low, exhibit market expansion effects when imitative ability is high.
The latter results draw attention to the different behaviour of industries and illustrate why it is useful to look beyond Total Manufacturing exports. Fabricated Metal products form about 60% of manufactured exports from these five countries and it is therefore unsurprising that the aggregate relationship reflects that of this industry so closely. The other two-digit industries present a range of outcomes. Strengthening IPRs is likely to change not only the volume but also the composition of imports from these advanced countries, although not necessarily in favour of the more R&D intensive industries. The broad shifts in the composition are largely independent of the level of imitative ability.
Our results show some evidence of market power effects, though these are not common.
While a negative coefficient was found on our IPR index in some regression for all industries, these coefficients were rarely statistically significant, and such cases invariably occurred in the "lowest" regimes. Thus for the single thresholds we had market power effects in Food for the least developed countries, and in Total Manufacturing and Fabricated Metal Products for the smallest markets. For the dual thresholds, significant market power effects were found for Other Manufacturing in small markets with low imitative ability, and for Chemicals, Textiles and Wood Products in countries with weak imitative ability and weak IPRs. These results indicate that market power effects are far from pervasive, but should not be discounted for the least developed, small countries with low imitative ability and weak IPRs.
In contrast market expansion effects are pervasive at the industry level. For the single thresholds we found evidence of statistically significant market expansion effects in each industry for at least one regime for all three threshold variables. These occurred at higher levels of development and at higher levels of imitative ability, but not necessarily at larger All regressions include a full set of importer, exporter and time effects that are not reported for brevity. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. t-statistics in brackets are based on White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. significance (first row) and the estimated coefficient on the IPR variable for each regime and its significance (second row). The coefficients on the remaining variables from the gravity model (including importer, exporter and time effects) are not reported for brevity. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. t-statistics in brackets are based on White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the estimated thresholds is found using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1996) with 1000 replications. Table 5 . Thresholds are then calculated based on the level of GDP in both the low and the high imitative ability regimes, giving a possible number of four regimes. In some cases no significant threshold on GDP is found for the high imitative ability regime, with the coefficient reported being that from assuming no threshold in the high imitative ability regime. The first row for each industry reports the estimated thresholds on both SYR and GDP, while the second reports the estimated coefficients on the IPR variable and their significance.
The coefficients on the remaining variables from the gravity model (including importer, exporter and time effects) are not reported for brevity. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. t-statistics in brackets are based on White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the estimated thresholds is found using the bootstrap procedure of Hansen (1996) with 1000 replications. 
